Miscellaneous

Second Circuit Describes Twombly as Having Created Heightened Pleading Standard for Antitrust Claims

By A. Benjamin Spencer

In our view, the cardholders have pled ?actual and imminent? harms sufficient to establish Article III injury in fact. There is no heightened standard for pleading an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy Article III standing simply because the alleged injury is caused by an antitrust violation. We recognize that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), requires a heightened pleading standard ?in those contexts where [factual] amplification is needed to render [a] claim plausible,? Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir.2007), including, most notably, the antitrust context. See Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (?In applying these general standards to a § 1 claim, we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.?) (footnote omitted). However, plausibility is not at issue at this point, as we are considering only Article III standing.

Full post as published by Federal Civil Practice Bulletin on April 28, 2008 (boomark / email).