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Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling

By Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance

The Program on Corporate Governance has recently issued as a discussion paper my piece, entitled Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling: Bad Appointments and Empty-Core Cycling at the Circus.

On the surface, the Ringling case appears to be an irrational spat over board seats by the heirs of a very successful enterprise. However, a closer inspection reveals that the investors were neither fighting over board seats nor were they irrational. Although Edith Ringling pushed her incompetent son and Aubrey Haley her inappropriate husband, they did so to their private advantage. Although the circus cycled from one management team to another, the investors always promoted the new teams for private gain.

I argue that the root of the Ringling dispute lay in the inability of the law to enforce duty-of-loyalty standards. When the law works as it should, fiduciary duties perform two functions: they remove the incentive to appoint corporate officials by kinship rather than ability, and prevent the empty core cycling that would otherwise plague so many close corporations. Here it performed neither. In the Ringling case, I argue that the various parties had incentives to defect in the next period regardless of the alliances they formed in the current period. When the law does not enforce a duty of loyalty, this allows cycling to occur. If the law gave each investor a return proportional to his or her interest in the firm, investor alliances would not cycle. Not only will investors not appoint inept kin, management will not cycle from alliance to alliance. The Ringling circus did not degenerate into the chaos in which it found itself because the investors were spoiled or irrational. It degenerated because the law could not enforce the duty of loyalty.

The full paper is available for download here.

Full post as published by The Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog on April 16, 2008 (boomark / email).